Military Innovation

This book by military strategist Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., is the definitive take on the race for military dominance in the twenty-first century. It shows how militaries that successfully pursue disruptive innovation can gain a major advantage over their rivals, while those that fail to do so risk exposing their countries to great danger.

The dropping of two atom bombs on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and their shocking aftermath finally ended World War II in the eastern theatre. But they weren't the only experimental weaponry at the time. In this fascinating account, Chris McNab examines the development of a range of hitherto unknown and at times shockingly effective weapons that were developed and unleashed on an unsuspecting world over the course of the war.

In the coming decades, artificial intelligence (AI) could revolutionize the way humans wage war. The military organizations that best innovate and adapt to this AI revolution will likely gain significant advantages over their rivals. To this end, great powers such as the United States, China, and Russia are already investing in novel sensing, reasoning, and learning technologies that will alter how militaries plan and fight. The resulting transformation could fundamentally change the character of war.

>The Innovation Book is your roadmap to creating powerful innovations that deliver success in a competitive world. With a practical, bite-size format, Mckeown will help you tackle the really important challenges and seize the most-valuable opportunities. The Innovation Book includes 24 of the most powerful tools and models to help innovators, game changers, mavericks, and revolutionaries make new ideas useful.

In five case studies of US Army doctrine, Campbell pits military realism against bureaucratic and cultural perspectives in three key areas - nuclear versus conventional warfare, preferences for offense versus defense, and COIN missions - and finds that the army has been more doctrinally flexible than those perspectives would predict. He demonstrates that decision makers, while vowing in the wake of Vietnam to avoid (COIN) missions, nonetheless found themselves adapting to the geopolitical realities of fighting “low intensity” conflicts.