Showing results for "Victory" in Weapons & Warfare

This book by military strategist Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., is the definitive take on the race for military dominance in the twenty-first century. It shows how militaries that successfully pursue disruptive innovation can gain a major advantage over their rivals, while those that fail to do so risk exposing their countries to great danger.

Innovating Victory: Naval Technology in Three Wars studies how the world‘s navies incorporated new technologies into their ships, their practices, and their doctrine. It does this by examining six core technologies fundamental to twentieth-century naval warfare including new platforms (submarines and aircraft), new weapons (torpedoes and mines), and new tools (radar and radio).

Nazi Germany was driven by a desire to dominate the world and create a new master race. Every aspect of life in the Third Reich was focused on the goal of Aryan supremacy, and science and technology were no exception. Under the Nazis, conventional science and a range of fringes sciences were legitimate areas for research and development.

Under the Nazis, conventional science and a range of fringes sciences were legitimate areas for research and development. Unorthodox ideas and projects that were too outrageous for other governments received funding. During the last six months of the war, it seemed obvious the Germans had been crushingly defeated, but in spite of the military situation, Hitler continued to believe that victory would be achieved. He repeatedly told his advisors and inner circle that Germany possessed Wunderwaffen - miracle weapons - that would turn the tide and give the Germans victory.

In February 1999, Pakistani Army personnel, disguised as jihadi militants, infiltrated into mountainous Kargil and occupied key vantage points. Their intrusion triggered a limited war between the world's newest nuclear states. It was a bitter battle, and one that threw up important lessons for...

The End of Victory recounts the costs of failure in nuclear war through the work of the most secret deliberative body of the National Security Council, the Net Evaluation Subcommittee (NESC). From 1953 onward, US leaders wanted to know as precisely as possible what would happen if they failed in a nuclear war—how many Americans would die and how much of the country would remain. The NESC told Presidents Dwight Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy what would be the result of the worst failure of American strategy.