Our Global Head of Fixed Income Research Andrew Sheets explains our differentiated view of a potential benign outlook for inflation, despite the recent acceleration.

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Andrew Sheets: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Andrew Sheets, Global Head of Fixed Income Research at Morgan Stanley.

Today, why is everything still so expensive?

It's Thursday, June 11th at 2pm in London.

The Federal Reserve has a so-called dual mandate, tasked with keeping the labor market healthy and prices stable. It is currently having much more success with the former than the latter.

Let's start with that good news.

Last Friday saw solid data from the U.S. jobs market, reducing some of the fears from earlier this year that artificial intelligence and other factors would lead companies to make do with fewer workers. The U.S. unemployment rate sits at just 4.3 percent, a historically low level. Measures like initial jobless claims indicate no large uptick in firings.

Yet the success within the U.S. labor market is mirrored by struggles with inflation. The Fed tries to keep inflation, the annual increase in a broad set of prices, to about 2 percent per year. Their preferred measure of these prices, so-called PCE inflation, well, it's been materially above this target over the last three months, six months, twelve months, and indeed, the last five years.

As for another key measure of inflation that was reported yesterday, CPI, overall prices increased more than 4 percent. While that was close to expectations, it still represents prices that are rising much faster than the Fed would prefer.

This leads to a dilemma. One diagnosis of what's going on is that elevated inflation is a sign that conditions are simply too loose and too accommodative at these levels of interest rates. Corporate capital expenditure and merger activity is surging, regulation is being eased, and the U.S. government is spending a lot more than it's taking in. All of these are consistent with a hot economic cycle, which in the past would've warranted higher interest rates to bring the economy back down to a more sustainable speed.

But it might not be that simple.

The surging spend that we're seeing on AI data centers feels pretty unique and almost insensitive to other dynamics. Indeed, we've seen a 700 percent increase in the price of memory over the last year. Yet it's done little to slow demand for this construction as the large, well-capitalized companies behind the AI buildout see it as so essential to their future success.

U.S. consumers are also still spending, boosted perhaps by record levels of household wealth. As just one example of this, my colleagues in Equity Research note that the price of airline tickets has gone up 25 percent over the last year, yet there's been no sign of people flying less.

Now, the positive story would be that while there are some high-profile categories like computer memory or airfare that are seeing these large price increases, the broader inflation picture is actually set to get better as the year goes on, and costs for things like housing and tariff-impacted goods moderate. That is our view at Morgan Stanley, where our economists think that inflation will ultimately be lower over the next twelve months – and lower than many in the market expect.

But there's definitely uncertainty.

This month, June, is one where central banks may appear to have a renewed commitment towards inflationary pressures; with the ECB hiking rates today and our expectation that the Bank of Japan will hike rates next week, while the Fed will remove their easing bias. And our more benign economic base case for inflation does assume that oil will start flowing through the Strait of Hormuz pretty soon. It may not, and that could also lead to more sustained inflationary pressure.

The big story on inflation has not gone away. Our assumption that pressures could ease in the second half of the year is a key and differentiated input to our forecast for lower bond yields and higher stock prices in 12 months' time. But it does rely on a change of the status quo.

As of now, inflation is still too high.

Thank you, as always, for your time. If you find Thoughts on the Market useful, let us know by leaving a review wherever you listen. And also, tell a friend or colleague about us today.

As AI demand surges, our Asia Energy Analyst Mayank Maheshwari discusses the new multi-trillion-dollar investment cycle to secure the power, fuels, grids and storage that keep modern life running.

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Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I’m Mayank Maheshwari, Morgan Stanley’s Asia Energy analyst.

Today: how AI’s rapid growth is forcing Asia into a massive energy buildout across power grids, fuels, storage and dependable energy and power generation.

It’s Tuesday, June 9th at 8am in Singapore.

Every time you ask AI to draft a note, summarize a file, plan a trip or generate an image, the response feels instant and easy. But behind it sits a very physical system: data centers, electricity, cooling, fuel, metals, power lines, storage tanks and ships.

There is no AI without energy. And in Asia, the power and energy needs could get much bigger. And right now, we are at a critical inflection point where energy, AI, and security converge into [a] once-in-a-generation investment cycle.

We see a super cycle with $5 trillion plus in new investments in energy over next five years, almost double of what we have seen in the past decade. And this has global implications as Asia consumes almost half of the world's energy needs – but produces only about a third of it at home. Energy markets may be global, but energy insecurity is local. It shows up in electricity prices, fuel shortages, factory delays, food supply pressure and household budgets.

By 2030, Asia’s energy use could rise by about 38 exajoules. That increase is roughly equal to all the energy the Middle East consumes today. Power demand alone could reach about 19 trillion units a year when expressed in kilowatt-hours. That is around four trillion more units of electricity usage than in 2025, driven by data centers, industry, and onshoring of businesses.

AI is now part of that demand story. By 2030, data centers could use roughly one-sixth of all new power units in Asia. That makes AI a major new load on the power system.

Meeting this demand requires a major investment cycle. Asia’s annual energy investment could rise to roughly US$1.1 trillion a year over the next five years. Much of that spending goes into the power system itself: generation, grids, storage and the equipment needed to connect everything.

Grids may be the biggest bottleneck. Think of [the] grid as the highway system for electricity. You can build more power plants, but if the roads clog up, the power does not reach homes, factories or data centers. Asia’s grid investment needs could reach close to about US$1 trillion by 2030. Transformer lead times have stretched to years in some cases, which shows how tight the equipment supply chain has become.

The hardest part is keeping the lights on every hour of the day. Baseload power means electricity that can run around the clock. Asia is adding a large amount of renewable power to its energy infrastructure. But that source depends on when the sun shines or the wind blows. That is why coal, gas and nuclear remain part of the conversation.

Storage also moves from useful to essential. Batteries help smooth out renewable power demand when supply rises and falls during the day. Global energy storage installations could rise from about 500 gigawatt hours in 2025 to around 3,000 gigawatt hours in 2030.

Powering AI also reaches beyond electricity. Data centers need power, but the system around them needs dependable fuels, grids, batteries, metals, refining, storage and shipping. Electricity has to be generated, moved, backed up and supplied through physical infrastructure. That is why this story pulls in copper and aluminum for grids, fuel refining for transport and petrochemical supply chains, and fertilizers because energy security also connects to food security.

The future may look digital, but it will be powered by something far more physical: the largest energy buildout Asia has seen in decades.

Thanks for listening. If you enjoy Thoughts on the Market, please leave us a review wherever you listen and share the podcast with a friend or colleague today.

The Head of our Europe and Asia Technology Team, Shawn Kim, explains how AI’s appetite for memory chips is boosting the cost of everything from data centers to smartphones, with consequences that may reach far beyond the tech industry.

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Shawn Kim: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I’m Shawn Kim, Head of Morgan Stanley’s Europe and Asia Technology Team.

Today, we’re talking about chipflation – when memory chips stop getting cheaper over time, and become more expensive and even harder to find.

It’s Monday, June 8th, at 3pm in London.

Memory chips are easy to ignore, until your laptop slows down, your phone costs more, or your cloud bill jumps.

Memory is the computer’s workspace. It holds whatever the machine needs at that moment, whether that is a web search, a video, a spreadsheet, or an AI model answering a question. DRAM is the fast memory inside servers, PCs and phones. NAND is what stores files in solid-state drives. And HBM, or high bandwidth memory, is the high-performance version sitting right next to the AI chip, helping them move huge amounts of data quickly.

That last one – HBM – is key because AI has become intensely memory hungry. Memory prices have risen more than six-fold over the last year, a sharp break from decades when the cost of DRAM generally kept falling.

The pressure is coming from AI infrastructure buildouts. We see servers accounting for 59 percent of DRAM demand by 2028, up from 37 percent in 2023. We also see enterprise solid-state drives reaching 65 percent of NAND demand, up from 18 percent. And simply put, data centers are taking a much bigger share of the memory pie.

AI memory use is climbing fast, and at every scale. A newer AI chip uses 7.2 times more HBM than earlier generations. A full system uses about 65 times more. Across an entire AI data center buildout, the jump gets even bigger. HBM has gone from roughly 10 terabytes in 2020 to about 18 petabytes in 2026, orders of magnitude more.

This demand is running into a supply chain that cannot respond quickly. New memory capacity takes years to build, qualify and ramp up. Supply relief is a process, not a switch. And that creates a two-tier market. Large AI and cloud buyers can sign long-term agreements, prepay and secure priority access. Traditional buyers, including PC makers, smartphone makers and industrial hardware companies, must compete for what remains.

This impacts everyday products. In 2027, we see PC memory demand potentially facing a 15 percent shortfall, equivalent to about 58 million PCs. Smartphones could face a 12 percent shortfall, equivalent to about 134 million units. Companies may have to raise prices, cut specifications, delay launches, and accept lower profits.

The dollar numbers are striking. We see the memory market growing from about $220 USD billion in 2025 to about $890 billion in 2026. Expectations for 2026 memory revenue rose 71 percent in just three months. That implies roughly $600 USD billion of incremental memory revenue in 2026, more than the annual market for smartphones, PCs, or servers, each taken on its own.

The broader economy may not see a significant direct inflation shock. We estimate the direct impact on headline CPI at about 0.1 percent in 2026. But pressure is showing up in producer prices, in corporate margins, cloud costs, capital spending plans and delayed technology upgrades.

AI has turned memory from the cheapest part of the digital economy into one of its most contested resources. These tiny chips most people never think of may now decide what gets built or delayed, and how much we all end up paying.

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Trade policy is once again in the news with the announcement of new tariffs. Our Head of Public Policy Research Ariana Salvatore digs into why tariffs may not be a disruptive factor for markets this time.

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Ariana Salvatore: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Ariana Salvatore, Head of Public Policy Research for Morgan Stanley.

Today, I'll be talking about how investors should be digesting the latest tariff headlines and what they could mean for the broader economic and market outlook.

It's Friday, June 5th at 10am in New York.

Tariffs are back in focus as the U.S. administration has proposed new levies following Section 301 investigations into more than 60 of our trading partners. At the same time, USMCA negotiations appear to have begun in earnest, with recent headlines focused on autos, including the possibility of raising regional content requirements for vehicles and auto parts.

Now, at first glance, these developments sound like a meaningful escalation in trade policy. But we think these headlines are best understood as a continuation of the existing tariff regime rather than a new and more disruptive phase.

Let's start with Section 301. Listeners may recall that the administration replaced the IEEPA tariffs with Section 122 following the Supreme Court's decision back in February. However, that was done under a temporary authority that expires in the end of July. It's been our view that as we approach that deadline, the administration would seek to replace the existing regime under a new authority.

The conclusion of the Section 301 investigations is really a step in that direction; or said differently, a continuation of existing policy. We see the administration preserving the current tariff regime come July, but without a larger inflation or growth shock.

The second issue is the USMCA. Raising regional content rules may be part of the negotiation now, and those changes could create sector-level friction. Similarly, we think it's possible we see escalation ahead of the July deadline as all three countries work to improve the existing trade deal.

Now that being said, we're still constructive on the longer-term trade alignment between the U.S., Mexico, and Canada, and we see structural and procedural constraints that are going to limit the downside risk to something like a potential withdrawal from the agreement.

We still expect the USMCA carve-out to remain in place even for Section 301 goods on a range of trading partners. That's because we think the administration sees value in maintaining supply chain integration within North America across a number of sectors. In general, we actually think the recent pattern on tariffs has been toward less, not more, trade pressure at the margin.

Recent months have come with several carve-outs, exemptions, and delays on broad-based and sectoral tariffs. That suggests that the administration is still sensitive to the downstream cost impact of tariffs, and of course, affordability matters politically heading into the midterm elections in November.

That view also fits with our broader U.S. economics outlook. Our economists continue to see a relatively benign macro backdrop. Growth is expected to remain trend-like, with consumer spending slowing but not collapsing, and strong AI-led CapEx offsetting some of the drag from higher energy prices and policy uncertainty.

On inflation, tariffs remain part of the story, but much of the pass-through appears to be already in the data. That pairs with a more constructive outlook for equity markets as well, as our strategists there see a strong earnings story supported by things like positive operating leverage, AI adoption, improving pricing power, and a broadening out in earnings growth.

So, the key message for investors is this: tariff policy is still noisy, and it will remain a source of headline risk. But in our base case, the administration is moving toward a more durable version of the current tariff regime, not a materially more disruptive or restrictive one. Section 301 replaces Section 122, the USMCA carve-out stays in place, and selective exemptions continue where the affordability or supply chain costs are too high.

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Our Global Commodities Strategist Martijn Rats discusses why the restart of oil flows through the Strait of Hormuz may be slower and tighter than the market expects.

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Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I’m Martijn Rats, Morgan Stanley’s Global Commodities Strategist. Today – how fast can Middle East production return?

It is Thursday, June the 4th, at 3pm in London.

Every time you pull into a gas station, those prices are staring back at you. What you see at the pump is just the front end of a global system we’ve been watching for months: tankers, storage, insurance, and shipping lanes, all still constrained by the Strait of Hormuz. But while prices at the pump are still high, Brent has actually fallen back to around about $92 a barrel.

In inflation-adjusted terms, today’s Brent price is actually right at the 50th percentile of the last 20 years – suggesting that the market is assuming a clean, near-term recovery in supply. Yet the disruption continues to be extraordinary. Roughly 11 million barrels per day of Gulf crude remains offline, close to half the region’s pre-conflict output.

We think the market may be too optimistic. Our working assumption is now that meaningful export recovery through the strait begins only in the second half of July. Even then, normal does not return with the flip of a switch.

First, ships need to be willing to sail. Owners and insurers need confidence that the waterway is safe. If mines remain in traditional shipping lanes, the strait can be technically open but still operate at reduced capacity. Clearing that risk can take weeks, and potentially several months.

Second, the tanker fleet is in the wrong place. When ships cannot work in the Gulf, they move elsewhere. Bringing enough empty tankers back to lift crude takes time.

Third, storage is a limiting factor. Oilfields cannot restart if export tanks are full. For producers that rely heavily on seaborne exports, empty tankers are therefore essential.

Last, oilfields themselves need restarting. Before the closure, around 36,000 wells were active across six Gulf producers. Roughly 10,000 of those are currently offline. After a shut-in of nearly five months, about 4,000 to 5,000 wells could face restart constraints. Reservoir pressure can decline, equipment can fail after sitting idle, and flowlines need cleaning and safety checks.

All told, around 75 percent of lost supply can probably come back within four months after flows through the Strait of Hormuz resume. But the final 25 percent may take well into 2027.

So why have prices not moved more? The market began this shock with buffers. Inventories were elevated, oil-on-water was high, and emergency relief releases helped. The U.S. increased seaborne net exports of crude oil and refined products from roughly 5 million barrels a day to 9 million barrels a day. At the same time, China’s seaborne net oil imports fell from around 13 million barrels a day a year ago to just over 7.5 million a day over the last 30 days.

But these cushions are thinning. Strategic reserve releases are scheduled to drop from about 2.5 million barrels per day in April through June to about 0.7 million in July and August. U.S. gasoline and diesel inventories are already well below five-year seasonal lows. China is already on track for five consecutive months of unusually low crude buying for April through August delivery. But that starts to raise the probability that Chinese buyers return for September barrels. Buying for September typically starts mid to late June.

Now, oil is trading like the disruption is nearly over. But at the same time, the physical system is telling a slower story. Prices may look calm on the screen, but the bottleneck is in tankers, storage tanks, wells, and crews.

Our Brent forecasts remain $110 per barrel for the second quarter and about $100 a barrel for the third quarter. We recently raised our estimates for the fourth quarter to $95 and the first quarter of 2027 to $85 a barrel, and expect a return to $80 eventually thereafter.

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