This is the start of a series into enforcing orders; this part focuses on enforcing financial remedy orders.

We are joined by Christopher Stirling (Field Court Chambers) and Kara Swift (Family Law in Partnership) who breathe life into this topic.

Chris starts with telling us that recitals that deal with the payment of money are enforceable: Austin v Haynes [2021] EWCA Civ 1919 per Moylan LJ. However, be careful about how you are drafting the recital to make sure that they are not conditional or incapable of definition.

In respect of property adjustment orders, Chris reminds us that they take effect immediately in equity once DA/Final Order is made: Mountenay v Treharne [2003] Ch 135. He also reminds us of the ability of the Court at the time of the final hearing to provide for deadlines for executing documents in default of which an application can be made ex parte to direct that a conveyancing solicitor or Judge should sign in the place of the defaulting party.

Kara then reminds us that orders for sale pursuant to S.24A of the MCA allows for orders for sale to be made at any time on or after the making of a financial remedy order making it useful standalone relief. She reminds us that a lump sum is a simple debt. It doesn’t take priority over any other debt, unless it is supported by a default order for sale.

Kara and Chris move on to discuss charging orders. Note, there are no formal time limits for making charging order – see Lowsley v Forbes [1999] 1 AC 329 – though any interest claimed on sums charged is limited to 6 years – s.24(1) LA 1980 – nor is there need to seek any permission after 6 years like some other forms of execution: see Frankl-Rietti v Cheltenham & Gloucester plc [2011] EWCA Civ 524 per Rimer LJ @ [21] – and once obtained have an indefinite “shelf life” – CA refused to set aside charging order made 16 years previously in Yorkshire Bank Finance v Mulhall [2008] EWCA Civ 1156

They are made via a 2 stage process – interim and final order – interim order usually an ex parte process – though can be made immediately at time of judgment/order – see Mostyn J in Green v Adams [2017] 2 FLR 1413 (though if lump sum may be more practical to make default order for sale).

Can get charging order where judgment debtor has some interest in charged asset and it is not necessary to establish the extent of that interest at stage of charging order - Walton v Alman [2017] 1 FLR 927 .

Kara tells us that 3rd party debt order – interim and final - is a mechanism to secure funds ahead of enforcing the direct payment of them to the applicant by the third party holding the funds. Note, A v Z (No 2) (Interim Third Party Debt Order), where an interim order was made against a party’s solicitors’ client account.

Enforcing costs orders is like any other lump sum, but it must be liquidated to be enforceable i.e. you need to have agreed the amount or had it assessed after on detailed or summary basis. You do not have to wait for the final order of the divorce.

Periodical payments order can be enforced by an attachment of earnings order. They can be made as part of the original final order, if someone has been defaulting or diverting income. Generally, there is no provision for interest - TW v TM (Minors).

They then talk us through:

• Warrants of control – the bailiffs/ Enforcement Officers
• Judgment summons see Barclay v Barclay [2022] EWHC 2026 (Fam) in respect of the burden of proof;
• Receivers – as a last resort if there are no other methods and proportionate.
• Blight v Brewster Orders – compelling a party to draw from a private pension;
• Thwaite jurisdiction – the power to vary executory orders where unjust not to do so

Are you up to date with how to apply for non-molestation orders? Jenny Beck KC (Beck Fitzgerald), and Charlotte Baker (4PB) join us to bring us up-to-date, and discuss Family Law Act Remedies.

Jenny was the Chair of the Family Justice Council that wrote the report providing Best Practice Guidance*. She starts by telling us why the guidance was necessary:

https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/FJC-Best-Practice-Guidance-for-Practitioners-Making-an-Application-for-a-Protective-Injunction-under-the-FLA-1996-with-Annex-1.pdf

Charlotte then explains how the President’s guidance should change our practice:

https://www.judiciary.uk/guidance-and-resources/the-pfds-guidance-2026-non-molestation-orders-under-the-family-law-act-1996-and-the-fjcs-best-practice-guidance-for-practitioners-on-making-an-application-for-a-protective-injuncti/

Charlotte and Jenny talk about the new draft orders. The orders no longer have the standard terms ‘not to use or threaten violence’ and ‘not to harass, intimidate and pester’. Jenny tells us they were removed because using and threatening violence is a criminal offence and not what these orders should be about, and it is hard to prove harassing, intimidating and pestering someone. However, she makes clear that these terms can be added back into the draft order if required. Jenny tells us that the respondent’s details should be included on the face of the order to make the order effective.

Jenny tells us about the procedural change in the President’s guidance. Namely, that the initial application should be heard on the papers, if that is not accepted it should be listed within a day for the applicant to make representations. Charlotte tells us that when making an application for a non-molestation order that you need to be able to explain what is happening right now that justifies protection and why it is that an order is required.

We discuss high acrimony cases and what to do when an application for a non-molestation order is made, and the respondent attends Court accusing the applicant of being just as bad. Both Charlotte and Jenny raise concerned about the times when Judges have tried to resolve matters by cross-undertakings.

We finally discuss whether practitioners should be advising their client to go to the Police for a DAPO, why it is that clients may prefer not to the police and why it is this form of remedy needs to exist for victim-survivors who prefer not to make a complaint to the police.

*Although Jenny joined us in her personal capacity today.